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Enter the
Dragon: China’s
Computer
Industry 
C hina’s shift from technological nationalism to a more pragmaticstrategy of developing national capabilities in conjunction withmultinational corporations has transformed its economy. Con-sistent with this transformation, China has revamped its indus-trial and technology policies, moving from an isolationist
approach aimed at achieving technological independence to become a major
producer of computer hardware and a major market for information tech-
nology products. 
In 1990, China had only 500,000 PCs in a country of more than 1.2 bil-
lion people. By 2000, mainland Chinese purchased more than seven million
PCs in a single year. During the same time, China’s production of computer
hardware grew from less than US$1 billion to US$23 billion.1
China’s policies clearly drew on the developmental approach of other Asia-
Pacific economies such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Each of these
became leaders in different segments of the global computer industry through
the strong support of government industrial and technology policies.2
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
A combination of factors influenced the growth of China’s computer indus-
try, including the roles played by domestic PC makers, foreign multination-
als, and Taiwanese contract manufacturers. In addition, government policies
promoted computer production and use, encouraged quasi-state-owned
enterprises to enter the PC industry, and invited foreign investment while
requiring foreign firms to transfer technology in return for market access. 
Regional environment
Starting with Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, and continuing with
Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan in the 1980s, the Asia-Pacific region became
the leading global producer of computer hardware and associated compo-
nents such as semiconductors, storage, and displays. Strategies varied con-
siderably in the various countries, as did outcomes, but these economies as
a group proved highly successful in developing globally competitive hard-
ware industries. Successful government policies most commonly involved a
combination of export orientation to achieve global competitiveness and
strong efforts to develop national capabilities such as infrastructure and
human resources.2
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P E R S P E C T I V E S
China’s computer-industry strategy includes sim-
ilar elements, as it has promoted exports and
invested heavily in building an information infra-
structure. On the other hand, China’s strategy also
embodies the government’s desire to catch up tech-
nologically while maintaining central control over
key aspects of the economy, reducing its dependence
on foreign technologies. For example, a February
2000 editorial published in the People’s Liberation
Army Daily, which speaks for China’s military,
argued that China must develop its own software.
The editorial stated, “Without information security,
there is no national security in politics, economics
and military affairs. While learning from others,
China should not be under their control.”3 This will-
ingness to learn from outsiders without surrendering
technological or economic control has been a guid-
ing philosophy behind China’s computer policies.
Conforming with this philosophy, China has
opened its computer sector to foreign firms—
including US, Taiwanese, and a few Korean and
Japanese PC companies—to attract investment and
technology. It has also promoted exports by joining
the global production networks of multinational
corporations.
Because it is unwilling to give foreign firms control
of its computer market, the government directly lim-
its the role of foreigners in telecommunications ser-
vices, data communications, and Internet services.
In computer hardware, it promotes domestic firms
through direct and indirect support such as favored
treatment in government procurement and access to
technologies developed in state R&D institutions.
China’s desire to develop strong domestic computer
makers with indigenous technological capabilities
echoes that of Japan, Korea, and, to a lesser extent,
Taiwan. Each of these economies has provided finan-
cial and technical resources to domestic companies
and, in some cases, protected them from foreign com-
petition. China’s strategy of extracting concessions
from foreign multinational companies in return for
limited market access parallels Japan’s earlier strat-
egy, which also relied on a large and attractive mar-
ket to entice foreign corporations. With much smaller
domestic markets, Taiwan and Singapore relied more
on partnerships with multinational companies, which
provided critical access to global markets. 
Although China has tried to create industrial con-
glomerates similar to Japanese keiretsu or Korean
chaebol, the basic ownership structure remains much
different, as even firms listed on stock exchanges
remain under the control of government agencies or
collectives. 
In terms of policy institutions, China clearly
learned from the problems created by bureau-
cratic competition in Japan and Korea, where
ministries of industry and trade competed
over policy turf with telecom ministries, often
leading to policy inertia and redundant efforts.
China’s policy approach more closely paral-
lels Singapore’s, which has resolved bureau-
cratic competition through restructuring and
top-level intervention. 
The Chinese government initially assigned
primary responsibility for the computer
industry to the Ministry for the Electronics
Industry. However, the convergence of com-
puters and telecommunications put the MEI
in conflict with the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
communications on several issues, especially with
each ministry having its own telecommunications
operating company. To eliminate this competition,
the State Council combined the two ministries with
segments of other ministries to form the new
Ministry of Information Industry, which has clear
supremacy over most IT policies. 
MII plans China’s information infrastructure,
develops its national computer policies, and licenses
and selects key government-supported companies.
Its strategy for developing domestic industry has two
key parts:
• leveraging access to its market in exchange for
technology and investment from foreign firms,
and
• stimulating domestic firms through regulation
and subsidies.
While its policies are consciously similar to those
of its neighbors in many ways, China has adapted
them to fit its unique strategic objectives and
national environment.
National environment
Several environmental factors have influenced the
development of China’s computer industry, shaping
the government’s policy options and affecting the
decisions of domestic and foreign firms. The fol-
lowing three are the most crucial.
Mushrooming domestic market. China’s domestic
market has grown at double-digit rates for two
decades, becoming the second or sixth largest in
the world, depending on whether analysts use mar-
ket exchange rates or purchasing-power-parity
equivalents to measure the market’s size. At market
rates, China’s GNP is about US$1 trillion, while in
purchasing power parity terms, it is more than
US$4 trillion.
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The Chinese government has spurred the
growth of the computer hardware market
directly by promoting the use of computers,
lowering tariffs and thus lowering the price of
PCs, and promoting computerization of state-
owned enterprises. Observers also indirectly
attribute the expansion of the PC market to
China’s One-Child Policy and the Chinese
belief in education, as many Chinese parents
have bought PCs to help their children with
schoolwork. Not surprisingly, the Chinese
government dangled access to its PC market
as a carrot to foreign firms in return for vari-
ous concessions.
Transitional economy. China’s computer industry
developed within the context of the country’s trans-
formation from a centrally planned economy to a
mixed or market socialist economy. While other
Asian economies have pursued their industry devel-
opment strategies within a capitalist-market context,
China has pursued its strategies in a transitional
economy, leading to unusual structures that include
both private-capital and state ownership. This inter-
twining of government and markets makes it difficult
to identify the usual distinctions between market
forces and government policy.  
Strong technological base. China built its computer
industry on the foundation of a large science and
technology complex with technological capacities
well beyond those of most developing countries. As
part of its economic transition, China transformed
its science and technology system to spur growth
and development.4 It did so partly by creating state-
owned but market-oriented enterprises linked to
commercializing the technologies developed in
state-owned research institutions. These enterprises
now include the four largest Chinese PC makers:
Legend, Founder, Stone, and Great Wall.
COMPUTER INDUSTRY POLICY 
Computer technologies have been a Chinese gov-
ernment priority since it introduced the first long-
term science and technology development plan in
1955. A computer was first built in China in 1958,
copying a Soviet model. In the 1970s, China began
producing computers for industrial and commercial
uses, and its first microcomputers were built in 1977.
However, these computers relied on imported com-
ponents and were produced in small quantities.4
China’s drive to create a commercially oriented
computer industry formed part of a larger effort to
create an electronics industry, which formally began
in 1986 with the Seventh Development Plan. In that
plan and subsequent ones, China’s electronics indus-
try received special emphasis and support as a “pil-
lar” industry that would lead development of the
entire economy.
Computer policy goals
China’s computer policy encompasses all com-
puter types but focuses mainly on the PC industry,
as expressed in the major goals of the Ninth Five-
Year National Development Plan, 1996-2000: 
• increase the percentage of domestic compo-
nents in Chinese-assembled computers and in-
crease the nation’s capacity to produce periph-
erals such as monitors, printers, disk drives,
add-on cards, and high-definition displays;
• achieve a per capita national computer pene-
tration of one percent, 20 percent among
urban families;
• develop two to three domestic PC manufac-
turers into enterprises with an annual produc-
tion capacity of more than US$1 billion;
• apply computer technologies to the renovation
of traditional industries; and 
• develop uniform PC standards via a produc-
tion licensing system to answer complaints
about lack of service and intellectual property
protection on clone PCs.
The Ninth Development Plan also emphasized a
series of “golden projects” intended to serve sev-
eral purposes:5
• modernize the country’s IT infrastructure on a
very large scale,
• integrate the central government with the
provinces and integrate the ministries within
the government,
• stimulate computer use throughout the coun-
try, and 
• support the information technology industry—
specifically the hardware, software, and infor-
mation services sectors in computers and
telecommunications.
Foreign firms
China invited foreign computer makers to help
develop its industry, often requiring them to trans-
fer technology and form alliances with domestic
companies in return for production licenses and
market access. Multinational companies such as
Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, and Compaq formed
joint ventures with local companies to market their
own products and gain access to local distribution
channels. IBM negotiated with MEI on a joint ven-
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ture agreement in 1984, but they failed to agree on
details and IBM ended up going alone for a time.
However, IBM failed to penetrate the Chinese PC
market, and ultimately entered a joint venture with
Great Wall in 1994. This venture provided IBM
with local distribution channels and gave Great
Wall access to IBM technology and manufacturing
know-how. Table 1 lists major foreign PC makers,
their Chinese joint-venture partners, and their activ-
ities in China.6-9
Although China has discouraged the direct
import of computers by maintaining high tariffs and
taxes, it reduced tariffs from 82 percent in 1992 to
35 percent in 1993 and is expected to reduce them
to 15 percent upon joining the World Trade
Organization. The government regulated foreign-
vendor access to its markets by limiting the pro-
duction of foreign firms for the domestic market to
a certain percentage of their export production. 
To encourage exports, the government created
export processing zones in which imported mate-
rials used in production are free from duties and
taxes when exported directly. The government also
slowed foreign firms and increased their costs with
certification processes regarding quality, local con-
tent, and export limits. All these measures were
intended to allow domestic firms time to become
established. 
Domestic firms
The government has promoted domestic enter-
prises, but it does not directly manage these firms.
Rather, it has dealt with them as part of govern-
mental restructuring and enterprise reform. It has
advocated separating politics from enterprise man-
agement, combining research with industry and
trade, and forming joint ventures with foreign firms. 
Many domestic computer makers who had oper-
ated on a small scale became favorites of their
supervising government departments and quickly
expanded their operations by partnering with, or
transferring technologies from, foreign companies.
Major computer companies such as Great Wall,
Legend, and Founder grew in this way.
The ownership structure of the Chinese PC mak-
ers is quite unusual from a Western-capitalist per-
spective, but it reminds us that the market structure
still contains elements of socialism. Market leader
Legend is closely affiliated with the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, the leading government
research institution. Likewise, Founder Group is
affiliated with Beijing University, and Great Wall is
a spin-off of the Ministry of Electronics Industry.
Each of these enterprises was restructured into joint-
stock companies and went public on either the
Hong Kong or local stock exchange. Yet each is
controlled by a holding company owned by the affil-
iated government institution.4 Despite their status as
state-owned or collective enterprises, each is clearly
managed in an entrepreneurial, market-oriented
manner, making the Chinese PC market highly com-
petitive.
Providing access to technologies developed by
state R&D institutions has proven a key government
resource. For example, researchers developed Great
Wall’s initial PC inside MEI research institutions,
and Legend commercialized various technologies
developed in CAS labs. These technologies enabled
the companies to develop successful commercial
products that sustained their growth and expansion
into new industries, including PC manufacturing.4
Local governments as policy institutions
In addition to the central government, China’s
provincial governments and large municipalities
have contributed to the development of the nation’s
computer industry. In contrast to the indirect role
of the state through the MII, the local governments
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Table 1. Major foreign PC company activities in China.
Joint venture (JV) or 
Foreign company wholly owned (WO)  Chinese partner Products, operations
IBM JV Great Wall Desktop and notebook PCs, 
storage products, motherboards
WO Servers  
Compaq JV Stone Group Desktop PCs
JV Star Group Notebook PCs
Hewlett-Packard JV Legend Desktop PCs, inkjet printers
Dell WO Desktop and notebook PCs 
Acer WO (3 separate units) Monitors, peripherals, motherboards,
software, networking equipment
Toshiba JV Tontru Servers  
NEC JV N/A Desktop PCs  
LG Electronics JV Tontru Monitors  
Siemens WO N/A Desktop PCs  
Source: C. Chung6 and Market Intelligence Center7,9
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play a direct role, providing the infrastruc-
ture, building sites, financing, and other sup-
port required to create or attract computer
firms that offer employment, economic devel-
opment, and the prestige of having a local
high-tech industry. 
Local governments have competed vigor-
ously with one another to attract computer
plants by offering lucrative government con-
tracts in exchange for locating a plant in their
area. In contrast to MII, local governments
took a more entrepreneurial approach that
avoided setting explicit policies or criteria for
support. If its plans fit with the well-being of
the locality, a small company could receive
support and expand quickly into an enterprise group
or public company with a much higher value.6
Companies that develop alliances with local gov-
ernments benefit from the pipeline effect. In this
arrangement, the government acts as a conduit for
providing the company’s needs—such as land,
labor, and capital—while promoting its products
to other governments, enterprises, and citizens.
Multinational corporations’ role
Beginning in the 1990s, foreign companies set up
PC production in China. In the early years, they
held as much as 60 percent of the market, but their
share has subsequently declined as local manufac-
turers moved to the fore. High tariffs combined
with government regulations to prohibit foreign
companies from trading directly with the Chinese
companies. Consequently, foreign PC makers
began to set up production in China and work with
local distributors by employing strategies such as
• pursuing joint ventures with domestic compa-
nies,
• forming alliances with domestic enterprises
favored by the government,
• using their partners’ sales channels to sell their
own products, or
• aligning themselves with local governments
seeking high-tech companies. 
Table 1 shows that most US vendors participate
in joint ventures with one or more domestic PC
makers to produce desktops, laptops, servers, and
peripherals. These ventures include the leading
domestic PC makers: Legend, Great Wall, Tontru,
Star, and Shida. Except for Toshiba, which is a
leader in the laptop market and has a joint venture
with Tontru, Japanese and Korean companies have
not made headway in the Chinese market.
For overseas vendors, the benefits of setting up
local manufacturing sites in China are especially sig-
nificant. During negotiations over tariffs and domes-
tic sales quotas, “they can argue that they earn
foreign exchange, build up local industry, and
relieve unemployment.”8 Further, these vendors also
let China’s local governments make arrangements
and selections for their joint-venture partners
because these Chinese partners “often have strate-
gic locations and a reserve of local good will.”8
However, these efforts to become more localized
have not guaranteed success. Foreign vendors’ mar-
ket shares actually dwindled in the late 1990s
because Chinese PC makers, by ruthlessly trimming
their prices, successfully sold to domestic cus-
tomers. In response, foreign vendors increased their
joint ventures with local partners, hoping not only
to reduce “the risk of sudden policy shifts,” but also
to attract the purchasers of low-cost PCs.8
Taiwanese companies’ role
Taiwanese firms play a leading role in China’s
computer industry. They first entered China in
search of low-cost labor and production sites for
components and peripherals, but they have since
expanded the scale and level of their operations to
include PC production. They have also expanded
their role to doing contract manufacturing for for-
eign and Chinese firms and trying to penetrate
China’s computer market. 
Taiwanese PC makers initially entered China in
the early 1990s with low-end, shoestring opera-
tions intended to hold costs and risks to a mini-
mum. They often routed investments through
Hong Kong to circumvent Taiwanese government
restrictions on direct investment in China.
Taiwanese companies have markedly increased
their investment since 1995 in response to price pres-
sures from US PC companies and fierce competition
among Taiwanese suppliers and manufacturers.
Also, Taiwanese PC makers realized, as other multi-
nationals had, that they must localize production if
they wanted access to China’s large market.
Consequently, in the past several years major
Taiwanese firms such as Acer, Quanta, Arima, Hon
Hai, FIC, GVC, Twinhead, and Huasheng have built
production facilities in China.
The share of Taiwanese companies’ computer
hardware and software produced outside Taiwan
increased from 25 percent of gross output in 1995
to 43 percent in 1998 and to 51.7 percent in 2000.9
A large proportion of that production took place
in mainland China. In 2000, Taiwanese firms pro-
duced from 78 to 95 percent of various components
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and peripherals offshore, with 60 to 90 percent pro-
duced in mainland China. Taiwanese firms also
produced 84 percent of their desktops offshore.
They produced 47 percent of their motherboards
offshore with 45 percent produced in China.10
Taiwanese government restrictions—referred to
as the “no-haste, be patient” policy—have kept its
firms from producing certain high-end products on
the mainland, such as notebook PCs. Taiwan’s
notebook makers, who account for almost half of
the world’s output, have worked around the ban
by making components and base units in China,
then shipping them abroad for final assembly.
However, analysts expect that the government will
end these restrictions under pressure from the
industry. Anticipating a change in the rules, all of
Taiwan’s major notebook manufacturers have
invested in mainland facilities to produce complete
notebooks.11
COMPUTER INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
China’s domestic computer hardware market
grew to US$13.8 billion during 2000, up from less
than US$1 billion in 1990. Market growth climbed
as high as 70 percent in 1993, when import duties
were reduced, and averaged 31 percent a year
throughout the 1990s. PC sales reached 7 million
units in 2000 from only several hundred thousand
in the early 1990s.
Meanwhile, as Table 2 shows, China’s computer
industry, virtually nonexistent in the early 1980s,
became the world’s fourth-largest computer hard-
ware producer in 2000. Total production reached
US$23.1 billion, over four times the US$5.6 billion
produced in 1995.
China has achieved its national policy goal of
increasing exports to earn foreign currency.
Computer exports increased dramatically between
1990 and 1998, from US$227 million to more than
US$10 billion, as Table 3 shows. Moreover, China
had an overall trade surplus in computers totaling
US$4.86 billion in 1998, compared to a deficit of
US$325 million in 1990. Exports grew dramati-
cally after 1994, when China established export-
processing zones and offered tax breaks to attract
overseas investment.
China’s exports mainly result from production
by foreign computer vendors. China’s domestic
vendors concentrate primarily on the domestic
market, although a few, such as Legend, have
begun exporting to other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. Four products mainly generate the
trade surpluses: PCs, monitors, hard-disk drives,
and printers.
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
Analysts report that Chinese brand-name PCs
are “very advanced systems and very competitive
with the multinationals.”12 The country’s domestic
PC makers have grown by focusing on the middle
and lower end of the market and taking market
share from foreign vendors and clone makers.
However, price competition among domestic ven-
dors has reportedly driven margins to near zero,
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Table 2. Top five countries’ share of global computer production.
Country 1985 (percent) 1990 (percent) 1995 (percent) 2000 (percent) 2000 rank  
US 49.2 27.0 26.5 26.1 1  
Japan 18.9 29.2 25.2 16.3 2  
Singapore 1.2 3.9 7.3 7.6 3  
China 0 0.4 1.9 6.8 4 
Taiwan 1.0 3.3 5.6 6.5 5  
Source: Calculated from Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, 2001.
Table 3. China’s computer trade balance in millions of US dollars.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Exports 227   314    820 1,258 2,006 3,750 5,315 7,543 10,169 
Imports   552   668 1,344 1,344 1,763 2,403 2,876 3,868  5,300 
Trade balance  –325   –354     –524      –86       233 1,347 2,439 3,675  4,869 
Source: Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, 2000.
34 Computer
bringing about reorganizations, acquisitions,
and changes in top management at some
Chinese PC companies. 
Chinese PC makers also lack the
economies of scale enjoyed by vendors such
as Compaq, Dell, HP, and IBM, who have
sales volumes of nine to 17 million PCs per
year. In contrast, a fragmented domestic mar-
ket is leading to low production by individ-
ual Chinese PC makers, with the exception
of market leader Legend. Local and regional
government incentives to domestic PC mak-
ers may encourage expanded production by
smaller vendors, leading to market fragmentation
and excess capacity. 
A major challenge for China’s computer industry
will be to move beyond production of standard PCs
for the domestic market and low-value peripherals
and components for the global market. With
China’s strong base of technical skills and its abil-
ity to attract foreign investment and technology,
the country has a reasonable chance to do so.
Legend is moving into software, Internet services,
and information appliances, while other hardware
makers are expanding their scope as well. However,
developing a more knowledge-intensive industry
will require relaxing controls on information and
providing greater government protection of intel-
lectual property.
Greater China
Perhaps the most significant development in
China’s computing industry is the degree to which
its PC segment links to Taiwanese firms for pro-
duction capacity, technical know-how, and capital
investment. It is widely known that Taiwanese com-
panies have undertaken manufacturing for foreign
multinationals in China, but it is less well-known
that they have also been manufacturing for China’s
domestic companies.6 Taiwanese involvement
would be even greater if the Taiwanese government
relaxed its remaining controls on mainland invest-
ment.
Despite these controls and the political risks
involved, Taiwanese companies are investing
rapidly in mainland China, seeking a place in this
fast-growing market. This trend combines
Taiwan’s management, design skills, and relation-
ships with leading global computer companies
with the mainland’s low-cost labor at all levels,
potentially huge market, and Hong Kong’s com-
mercial capabilities. As a result, Greater China
promises to be a formidable competitor in the
global computer industry. 
Greater China is succeeding already as an export
platform to the global PC industry as well as a pro-
ducer for the domestic Chinese market. Combined
computer hardware production by mainland China
and Taiwan was expected to outpace Japan in
2001. Analysts anticipate that China will be the
second-largest PC market in the world by 2003 or
2004. China already has the second-largest market
for mobile devices, a market that Taiwanese com-
puter makers are now aggressively targeting. In the
wireless market—which is more evenly distributed
among European, US, and Asian firms—Greater
China can have a much stronger impact on tech-
nological trajectories than it has on PCs, which US
standards dominate.
What will happen to Taiwanese companies as
China’s own manufacturers improve their capabil-
ities? Will China’s domestic firms continue to rely
on Taiwanese companies as suppliers, or will they
replace them? Will foreign vendors continue to rely
on Taiwanese companies producing in China or
will they turn to Chinese companies? From
Taiwan’s point of view, an equally big issue is
whether Taiwanese companies will succeed by
abandoning Taiwan and moving most of their pro-
duction to China and, if so, what will be left for
Taiwan to do.
Lessons for foreign companies
For foreign companies, China offers a large but
often difficult market in which to do business. Not
only does the government favor local firms, these
firms also benefit from their intimate knowledge of
the market. In recent years, the world’s second- and
third-largest PC makers, Compaq and HP, have
both seen their market share in China fall sharply. 
Success requires foreign companies to partner
with Chinese companies to gain distribution-chan-
nel and market access while they also operate their
own independent subsidiaries. The IBM-Great Wall
partnership offers the most successful example of
this practice. However, many partnerships have led
to disappointment, with the two sides unable to
collaborate effectively. In some cases, Chinese dis-
tributors have defaulted on credit that foreign ven-
dors have extended to them.
While many potential pitfalls in dealing with tra-
ditional distribution channels remain, bypassing
these channels by selling direct is difficult, as Dell
found out. Dell’s direct model does not work well
with individual consumers or small and medium-
sized enterprises in China because they lack expe-
rience in PC use. Chinese consumers also feel
uncomfortable with ordering a product they cannot
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touch or see in advance. Dell built an assembly
plant in China to support its direct model there,
but it has also been forced to develop relationships
with local distributors and resellers who can give it
access to large corporate accounts. 
Finally, having manufacturing capabilities inside
China is vital, both to avoid tariffs and the value-
added tax and to show a commitment to the
Chinese market. Such a commitment is needed if a
company hopes to sell to government agencies and
state enterprises, which make up most of China’s
large business and institutional markets.
Implications for other developing countries
China’s success in developing its computer indus-
try has limited application to other developing
countries. China has succeeded with an import-sub-
stitution strategy that proved to be much less suc-
cessful in India, Brazil, and Mexico during the
1980s. This success is due in large part to the size
and dynamism of China’s market, but other factors
also played an important role. Chief among these
were China’s policy of exchanging market access
for foreign technology, requiring foreign multina-
tionals to export much of their production, insist-
ing that foreign multinationals develop joint
ventures with domestic companies, and letting
Taiwanese companies set up production networks
in China to support domestic companies. Few, if
any, developing countries would have such desir-
able markets or be able to attract foreign invest-
ment on terms so favorable to the host country. 
On the other hand, other developing countries can
follow China’s strategy of promoting computer use
to modernize their economy and create demand for
local firms. Also, China has focused on developing
and exploiting national capabilities to support com-
puter production and use. These capabilities include
human resources, R&D institutions, and an infor-
mation infrastructure, all of which can be upgraded
in most developing countries. Finally, while China
has favored domestic firms, it has maintained a highly
competitive local computer market. This approach
benefits computer users and also helps domestic firms
prepare to compete in markets outside China.
China’s computer industry policies have suc-
ceeded in expanding both production and com-
puter use, taking advantage of domestic capa-
bilities as well as attracting leading multinationals
to produce in China. Although China’s growing PC
market has created opportunities for domestic and
foreign PC makers alike, the latter have seen their
market shares shrink dramatically, an outcome con-
sistent with the government’s desire to avoid for-
eign domination of its IT sector. Among domestic
PC makers, Legend has leaped well ahead of its
competitors. It and other branded PCs have taken
market share away from white-box clones, a trend
also consistent with government objectives.
Meanwhile, investment by Taiwan’s PC makers has
helped China become part of the global PC pro-
duction network, while also increasing Taiwan’s
economic linkages to China. 
C hina has become a major force in the globalPC industry, as both the most attractivegrowth market and as a large producer. It
has done so through a combination of industry pro-
motion and entrepreneurial energy that has taken
advantage of the country’s unique characteristics.
New challenges loom as China joins the World
Trade Organization and faces more pressure to
completely open its market to foreign competition.
By now, however, China’s PC makers are strong
enough to compete on an even footing in their
home market. Some may also be ready to compete
in other markets as well, potentially presenting a
new challenge to today’s global PC leaders. 
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